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Legal Empowerment and Horizontal Inequalities
after Conflict
LARS WALDORF
Dundee Law School, Dundee, UK
ABSTRACT This article explores whether legal empowerment can address horizontal inequalities in post-conflict
settings, and, if so, how. It argues that legal empowerment has modest potential to reduce these inequalities.
Nevertheless, there are risks that legal empowerment might contribute to a strengthening of group identities,
reduction of social cohesion, and, in the worst case, triggering of conflict. It looks at how two legal empowerment
programmes in Liberia navigated the tensions between equity and peace.
1. Introduction
The inclusion of access to justice in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) may well give further
impetus to programming for legal empowerment of the poor, particularly in post-conflict contexts1
where a sizable percentage of the world’s poor reside. To date, legal empowerment has tended to focus
on vertical inequality (in income and power) between rich and poor. Yet, in many post-conflict
environments, the more salient concern is horizontal inequalities between different ethnic groups2 as
these can lead to new or renewed conflict.
Can legal empowerment address horizontal inequalities in post-conflict settings, and, if so, how?
The ability of legal empowerment programmes to actually reduce horizontal inequalities depends of
course on context, including the nature of the political settlement.3 The context is far more ‘inauspi-
cious’ where political, social, economic, and cultural inequalities are mutually reinforcing; these
horizontal inequalities are deeply embedded in the political settlement, socio-economic structure,
cultural norms, and plural legal systems; and the inequalities were among the causes of conflict.
The article argues that legal empowerment has some limited potential to reduce horizontal inequalities
but that this needs to be done in a conflict-sensitive manner to avoid reinforcing group identities,
raising inter-group tensions, reducing social cohesion, and, in the worst case, triggering conflict.
The aim of this article is to bring distinct academic and policy discourses – around legal empower-
ment, horizontal inequalities, and, to a lesser extent, social cohesion – that rarely intersect into greater
conversation with one another. These literatures are still relatively new and their evidence bases
correspondingly thin. Consequently, this article is more an exploratory, conceptual effort to think
through the opportunities and challenges of using legal empowerment to address horizontal inequal-
ities in post-conflict settings – an issue that until now has received scant attention. It also aims to
contribute to the limited literature on the political economy of legal empowerment (see Desai, Wagner,
& Woolcock, 2014; Domingo & O’Neil, 2014). More research, however, is needed before conclusions
can be made with confidence.
This article starts by discussing legal empowerment and the contextual drivers for effective
implementation in post-conflict contexts. Next, the article considers whether and how legal empower-
ment might reduce horizontal inequalities while mitigating the risks of doing harm. It then looks at
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how two different legal empowerment programmes in Liberia did (but mostly did not) address
horizontal inequalities. The article concludes with some thoughts on further research as well as policy
implications.
2. Legal empowerment
2.1. Legal empowerment in theory
Stephen Golub coined the term ‘legal empowerment’ in the early 2000s to describe a bottom-up
alternative to the ‘rule of law orthodoxy’ that focused on reforming state institutions. Golub (2003,
p. 3) defined legal empowerment broadly as ‘the use of legal services and related development
activities to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives.’ Various development actors
adopted the term but with different understandings. The most ambitious effort to conceptualise legal
empowerment and translate it into policy was that of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the
Poor. However, the Commission’s report failed to settle the definition of legal empowerment or to
articulate a clear theory of change.4 A year after the Commission’s report, the Asian Development
Bank (2009, pp. 9–10) stated that ‘There is insufficient consistency, precision, and clarity about what it
means, even among non-government organization providers of legal empowerment services.’
Legal empowerment suffers conceptual schizophrenia in several respects. First, the Commission’s
2008 report was an awkward mash-up of Hernando de Soto’s neo-liberal prescriptions and Amartya
Sen’s capabilities approach, although the former dominated.5 Second, legal empowerment’s goal
(empowering the poor) is political and transformational while the means used (law or liberal legalism)
often depoliticise and defend the status quo. Put differently, legal empowerment assumes that law and
legal action are empowering, thus downplaying the many ways in which they can disempower, divert
resources from collective political action, or become merely ‘palliative’ (Cornwall, 2017, p. 7). Third,
legal empowerment emphasises individual agency (‘making choices’, or ‘power to’) but such agency
is inevitably shaped by individual self-efficacy (‘power within’),6 possibilities for collective action
(‘power with’), and existing structures of exclusion (‘power over’).7 Fourth, legal empowerment seeks
to increase the agency of a fairly abstract individual rights-holder, whereas most individuals in the
Global South tend to think of themselves as embedded in larger collectivities (for example ethnic
groups) and bound by clientelist obligations. For instance, the Commission’s 2008 report mostly views
individuals as decontextualised ‘citizens’, ‘asset holders’, ‘workers’, and ‘business-women’ (p. 27),
but then elsewhere briefly acknowledges the importance of indigenous people’s identity and collective
assets (for example, p. 36). Finally, legal empowerment invokes the critical consciousness of early
empowerment interventions in development (see Cornwall, 2017, pp. 7–9) without fully appreciating
the way that legal consciousness may constrain critical awareness of the law (see Silbey, 2005).
Putting the conceptual problems to one side, this article adopts the UN Secretary General’s definition.
That definition is the most authoritative, having been endorsed by the UN General Assembly. It has also
been operationalised by the UN Development Programme and other development actors. According to
the UN Secretary General, legal empowerment is ‘the process of systemic change through which the
poor are protected and enabled to use the law to advance their rights and their interests as citizens and
economic actors’ (UN Secretary General [UNSG], 2009, para. 3; emphasis added). As that language
made clear, legal empowerment is meant to be systemic by connecting the top-down/supply-side (the
state’s protection of the poor) and the bottom-up/demand-side (the poor’s use of law). The Secretary
General also went beyond the Commission’s market-driven emphasis on property, labour, and so-called
business rights to include education, health, and housing rights that are just as essential, if not more so,
for empowering the poor (UNSG, 2009, paras. 7, 34, 41, 46, 53).8
Legal empowerment has four components: rights enhancement, rights awareness, rights enablement,
and rights enforcement (US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2007, pp. 11–27; see
Asian Development Bank, 2009, pp. 40–49). Rights enhancement involves more inclusive law-making
processes and pro-poor law reform. Rights awareness is often accomplished through legal literacy
campaigns. Rights enablement typically consists of legal aid in the form of pro bono lawyers,
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community paralegals, and university law clinics. Rights enforcement includes state courts, ombuds-
men, National Human Rights Institutions, alternative dispute resolution, and customary justice.
Legal empowerment is part of a larger trend in development to enhance voice and accountability for
the poor and marginalised (see Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). As such, it is closely allied to
social accountability (Cornwall, 2017; Grandvoinnet, Aslam, & Raha, 2015; pp. 25–27; Joshi, 2017;
pp. 160, 163; Maru, 2010), which helps enable ordinary citizens to hold both state and non-state
service providers accountable through activities like citizen juries, participatory budgeting, public
expenditure tracking, and social audits.9 Social accountability seeks to reduce the ‘fear factor’ that
constrains voice and to increase the capacity of accountability mechanisms to provide meaningful
redress (Fox, 2015, p. 353). It further endeavours to reduce perceptions of injustice, increase trust, and
facilitate collective action (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015, pp. 194–197).
Despite the overlap, there are three key differences between legal empowerment and social
accountability (Joshi, 2017, pp. 163–164). First, legal empowerment involves explicit use of the
law. Second, it goes beyond service delivery. Finally, legal empowerment puts less emphasis on
collective action. That said, both legal empowerment and social accountability are fundamentally
concerned with strengthening the social contract between the state and the poor, particularly where
normal channels of political accountability are insufficiently responsive. Hence, Joshi (2017) recom-
mends integrating the two approaches. Legal empowerment gives ‘teeth’ to social accountability and is
better at the inclusion of marginalised groups (pp. 163–164). Meanwhile, social accountability keeps
the focus on systemic failures and collective action, thereby correcting the tendency of legal empow-
erment to ‘atomize social struggles’ (p. 167). Practitioners are starting to integrate these approaches,
particularly with respect to health care (for example, Joshi, 2017, pp. 164–166) and other socio-
economic rights (for example Feruglio, 2017, pp. 14–23).
There are inevitable risks to any social accountability, legal empowerment, or integrated programme
(see Grandvoinnet et al., 2015, pp. 212–213). One is that marginalised individuals and groups are
reluctant to meaningfully participate. Another is elite capture, whether by local or national elites. An
additional risk is state co-option or repression. A final one is that the programme may lead to greater
competition and conflict, especially if it is perceived as favouring particular groups.
2.2. Legal empowerment in practice
The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008, p. 333) recognised that legal empower-
ment ‘must usually be [implemented] under inauspicious conditions.’ It adopted a political economy
approach that emphasised best fit over best practice, function over form, locally-driven over
externally-imposed, and political pragmatism over normative ambition (2008, pp. 275–353). The
Commission (2008, p. 303) also set out different policy initiatives to fit varying contexts of political
competition and institutional strength.10 These initiatives range from community-based empowerment
in failing states to national-level reforms in strong democracies. The Commission (2008, p. 303)
recommended a policy of mobilising poor citizens in states where (as in Liberia) there is (1) ‘an
unstable mixture of formal and informal rule’; (2) ‘parties are based partly on personalities’; (3) ‘basic
rules of the game are established in law and practice, although they function poorly and intermit-
tently’; and (4) the state has low organisational capacity.
The dominant model of legal empowerment ‘under inauspicious conditions’ has become the
community paralegal programme. This is partly because states like Sierra Leone lack the collective
assets and political opportunity structures – well-funded public interest law organisations and a
‘reasonably accessible and functional judicial system’ (Gauri & Brinks, 2008; pp. 16–17; see
Gloppen, 2008) – for legal empowerment to take the form of impact litigation around socio-
economic rights. It is also partly due to the transnational advocacy networks that have disseminated
this model. When Open Society Foundation helped found the non-profit organization Timap for
Justice in 2003, it borrowed the notion of paralegal services from South Africa but adapted it to the
Sierra Leone context. Timap became highly influential as its co-founder, Vivek Maru, moved first to
the World Bank’s Justice Reform Group and then started Namati, an international NGO for legal
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empowerment. Both Open Society and Namati have pushed the community paralegal model through
how-to manuals, training, capacity-building, and networking. They have done alliance-building
(creating a transnational advocacy network, the Global Legal Empowerment Network) and advocacy
(particularly around SDG 16 and the Kampala Declaration on Community Paralegals). They also have
encouraged research and development on these paralegal programmes (see Maru & Gauri, 2018).
The diffusion of the community paralegal model raises some concerns. There is a risk that it
becomes a one-size-fits-all, technocratic template for legal empowerment. There is a related risk that it
frames legal empowerment too narrowly as demand-side access to justice (rights awareness and
enablement), thereby diminishing some of legal empowerment’s more transformative potential.
There is also the danger that community paralegal programmes, by playing a government-
substituting role, let governments off the hook for meeting their obligations to provide access to
justice. Indeed, these programmes often rely heavily on international donors, which makes them both
more vulnerable and less accountable (Maru & Gauri, 2018, pp. 26–27; Dugard & Drage, 2018,
68–70; Maru, Braima, Gauri, & Jalloh, 2018, pp. 200–202).
Community paralegals perform a range of legal roles: education, accompaniment, mediation,
mobilisation, advocacy, and, more rarely, litigation support (Maru & Gauri, 2018, pp. 9–12). They
also aid their clients to navigate among plural legal orders. Yet, most spend the bulk of their time
helping to mediate inter-personal disputes over land, labour, and family using customary dispute
resolution mechanisms (see Dale, 2009; pp. 1, 5; Sandefur & Siddiqi, 2013; p. 25). In that role, they
often insert formal law considerations (including human rights norms) into customary justice, thereby
‘enlarging the shadow of the law’ (Berenschot & Rinaldi, 2011, p. ii). That may (marginally) reduce
the power of customary authorities (tribal chiefs, clan elders, and so forth).
There is some evidence that community paralegals have a positive impact on settlement outcomes,
litigant satisfaction and livelihoods, and intra-community relations (Dale, 2009; Gramatikov et al.,
2015; Maru & Gauri, 2018; Sandefur & Siddiqi, 2013). However, these community paralegal
programmes are less successful at empowering the poor more broadly because their caseloads mostly
consist of low-level, inter-personal disputes that are resolved on a case-by-case basis. As Maru (2010,
p. 89) observed:
I have found that the dockets of generalist justice service providers often include disproportionate
numbers of intra-community conflicts – such as child support claims and land disputes – with
fewer cases involving failures of state institutions and public services. I suspect that these
proportions … are a sign that communities have not conceived of state failures as injustices
capable of remedy, and that legal empowerment organizations have not adequately demonstrated
their effectiveness in addressing state failure.
This lack of attention to the state and other duty-bearers stems from four factors. First, as Berenschot and
Rinaldi (2011, p. 37) explain, ‘by choosing to train villagers to work as paralegals within their community,
the programs diminish the chance of addressing problems involving state or corporate accountability-
’. Second, community paralegals mostly focus on the immediate needs of their clients and their commu-
nities rather than the larger, long-term interests of the poor and marginalised. Third, paralegals can be
(understandably) hesitant to confront powerful individuals within their own communities as well as state
officials. One evaluation of Timap revealed that, according to some clients, ‘Timap seemed afraid to
confront power structures or would likely perform less effectively in cases where local authorities were
involved’ (Dale, 2009, p. 22). Finally, it is difficult for community paralegal programmes to build bottom-
up demand for legal reform because ‘for both clients and paralegals avoiding the legal system is more
practical than trying to fix it’ (Berenschot & Rinaldi, 2011, p. 68).
These points echo Fox’s (2015, p. 352) argument that social accountability programmes which take
a tactical, or exclusively demand-side, approach rest on two ‘unrealistic assumptions’: ‘that people
who have been denied voice and lack power will necessarily perceive vocal participation as having
more benefits than costs’; and ‘that even if locally bounded voices do call for accountability, their
collective action will have sufficient clout to influence public sector performance – in the absence of
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external allies with both perceived and actual leverage’. Instead, Fox argues that strategic approaches,
which ‘manage to scale up voice and collective action beyond the local arena, while bolstering the
capacity of the state to respond to voice … are more promising’ (2015, p. 352; see Fox, 2016). Indeed,
the poor and marginalised need external allies (or champions) in civil society, the state, and interna-
tional community if they are to successfully challenge existing power relations and resource distribu-
tions. That is a key lesson from the experience of social accountability (McGee & Gaventa, 2011,
pp. 23–24) and justice claiming (Uhlin, Singh, Grugel, & Fontana, 2017, pp. 183–184) in the Global
South, as well as from the work of Kelsall, Hart, and Laws (2016) on expanding universal health
coverage.
Some community paralegal programmes have employed more strategic approaches. A specialised
programme in Mozambique that focused on land and natural resource governance adopted a ‘twin-
track’ approach: using paralegals to increase rights awareness and provide legal support while also
training land sector officers to be more responsive (Tanner & Bicchieri, 2014).11 The need for twin-
track approaches underscores that legal empowerment is a lengthy and incremental process. For
example, the programme with Mozambique’s land paralegals lasted 20 years (Tanner & Bicchieri,
2014, p. 110).
2.3. Legal empowerment’s evidence base
The Commission on Legal Empowerment’s report said surprisingly little about the evidence base for
legal empowerment or how to go about developing it further. Rather, the Commission (2008, p. 2)
took a somewhat faith-based approach to the efficacy of legal empowerment; for example, it stated ‘we
believe there is compelling evidence that when poor people are accorded the protections of the rule of
law, they can prosper’ without actually saying what that evidence was. Since then, legal empowerment
practitioners have attempted to map the growing evidence of legal empowerment’s outcomes and
impact (Goodwin & Maru, 2014, 2017; Golub, 2012; UN Development Programme [UNDP], 2014).
Namati (Goodwin & Maru, 2014, pp. 34, 42–43) and Golub (2012, pp. 1–2) have also encouraged
more rigorous and transparent evaluations of legal empowerment programming, while providing tools
to achieve that. Nonetheless, the evidence base for legal empowerment’s impact remains quite limited
(UNDP, 2014, p. 19).12 This is partly because legal empowerment programming is still relatively
young. It is also due to measurement difficulties caused by variable definitions of legal
empowerment,13 the range of possible impacts (Goodwin & Maru, 2017, p. 163, Table 1), positive
publication bias (Goodwin & Maru, 2017, pp. 159, 168–169), and the inevitable difficulty of showing
causation. Finally, the implementation and impact of legal empowerment depends on context: for
example, Maru and Gauri (2018, pp. 22–23) briefly noted that community paralegal programmes have
functioned differently in authoritarian, post-authoritarian, and post-conflict contexts.
The most extensive review of the evidence for legal empowerment’s impact was conducted in
2013–2014 by Namati’s Goodwin and Maru. They acknowledged taking an ‘expansive’ view of what
counts as evidence and also ‘tak[ing] the results at face value’ – that is, without judging the rigour of
the underlying studies (Goodwin & Maru, 2017, pp. 159, 160). Goodwin and Maru (2017, p. 165)
found that the most common methods used were case studies, qualitative interviews, and quantitative
surveys. Rather embarrassingly, participatory methods were rarely used to evaluate programmes meant
to be participatory and empowering (Goodwin & Maru, 2017, pp. 166–168). The majority of studies
looked at legal literacy and measured impact on people’s legal knowledge and agency (Goodwin &
Maru, 2017, pp. 169, 173–176). Fewer studies attempted to evaluate impact on the law, legal
institutions, and legal implementation probably because ‘[p]roving the definitive contribution made
by legal empowerment on government is much more difficult, especially when the desire is to link a
single intervention to large-scale processes of change’ (Goodwin & Maru, 2017, pp. 181, 183).
When Domingo and O’Neil (2014, p. 59) surveyed the legal empowerment literature, they found
little evidence ‘regarding whether and when legal empowerment contributes to structural or transfor-
mative change or results in, for instance, better health outcomes or more equitable land distribution at a
more aggregate level’. This partly reflects the fact that too many community paralegal programmes
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have adopted tactical approaches limited to rights awareness and enablement (Domingo & O’Neil,
2014, p. 59; see Fox, 2015). Goodwin and Maru (2017, p. 189) also recognised the lack of evidence
about how legal empowerment affects national level policy and hence how it can be effectively scaled
up. Finally, both Domingo and O’Neil (2014, p. 59) and Goodwin and Maru (2014, p. 17) point to the
need for more information about the contextual drivers of effectiveness for legal empowerment.
3. Legal empowerment and horizontal inequalities after conflict
3.1. Legal empowerment after conflict
Legal empowerment programmes work with the poor in both the Global North and Global South.
Increasingly, these programmes are being implemented in the challenging environments of post-
conflict states, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. But it is only recently that some scholars and policy-
makers have begun thinking about legal empowerment as potentially part of the peacebuilding
toolkit.14 In 2015, for example, UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff (2015) listed legal empower-
ment as one tool (among many) for preventing recurrence of gross human rights abuses.
Legal empowerment can be expected to work differently in post-conflict contexts. That is partly
because law and legal institutions are distinctive in those contexts (Bell, 2015). First, they sometimes
played a role in the conflict (through emergency regimes for example). Second, law and legal
institutions have frequently lost authority, capacity, and legitimacy. Third, there is rapid and often
recurring institutional change (see Levitsky & Victoria Murillo, 2009). Finally, international law and
norms play a larger role because of the weakening of domestic law, the role of international peace-
builders and transnational civil society actors, and the fact that they ‘offer “neutral” benchmarking
standards that are independent to any of the parties to the conflict’ (Bell, 2015, pp. 3–5).
The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008, p. 302) recognised that post-conflict
contexts – with their weak justice institutions and pressing land disputes – pose intense challenges for
implementing legal empowerment policy and programmes. Indeed, it is very difficult to do legal
empowerment (or other development programmes for that matter) where the very terms of the social
contract are unclear, states lack authority, capacity, and legitimacy, civil society lacks independence
and capacity, the rule of law is weak, and citizens lack trust (see Grandvoinnet et al., 2015, pp. 14–16).
Nevertheless, post-conflict contexts may promote norms and opportunity structures – including social
justice values, progressive constitutions, ratification and domestic incorporation of human rights
treaties, activist civil society, and independent judges – that make legal empowerment easier
(Domingo & O’Neil, 2014, pp. 43–45). Transitions may also alter power asymmetries (Domingo &
O’Neil, 2014, p. 58) in ways that align with empowering the poor. Whether the opportunities outweigh
the challenges depends of course on the specific context. Following Kelsall and Heng (2016, p. 26),
the opportunities for legal empowerment are likely to be greater where the political settlement is more
competitive, inclusive, and impersonal.
Still, we cannot expect legal empowerment programmes to be implemented as effectively in a
weakly-institutionalised state devastated by civil war (like Sierra Leone) as in a state with stronger
institutions that experienced post-election violence (like Kenya). There are several contextual drivers
of effectiveness for legal empowerment programming in post-conflict environments. Some are generic
to any development or peacebuilding programme in these settings: the conflict characteristics, conflict
termination, the balance of power between former warring parties, security situation, political settle-
ment, elite commitment, institutional strength, social cohesion, and international support (Bell, 2015,
pp. 5–6). Other factors are more relevant to post-conflict accountability, whether social accountability
initiatives (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015) or transitional justice mechanisms (Duthie, 2017): the nature of
the social contract, capacity of ‘virtuous’ civil society, and strength of the rule of law. A final set of
factors specific to legal empowerment are the content of the law, features of legal pluralism, structural
bias in formal and informal justice mechanisms, and external support for legal empowerment in civil
society and the donor community (Domingo & O’Neil, 2014, p. 58).
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3.2. Tackling horizontal inequalities
There are several rationales for legal empowerment to tackle horizontal inequalities in the wake of
conflict: equity, social cohesion, and conflict prevention. Horizontal inequalities are perceived inequal-
ities ‘between culturally defined groups’ and they can have one or more dimensions: political,
economic, social or cultural status (Stewart, 2008, p. 3). These dimensions can be mutually reinforcing
or cross-cutting. Although horizontal inequalities intersect with other inequalities (such as class,
gender, disability) (Paz Arauco et al., 2015), they are often more stubbornly entrenched (Lenhardt
& Samman, 2015, p. 31). There is strong evidence that mutually reinforcing horizontal inequalities
make the political settlement more shaky and the resumption of conflict more likely (Fjelde & Ostby,
2014; Stewart, 2008), especially where a disfavoured group’s elites suffer political inequalities and can
then mobilise group members around broadly shared socio-economic inequalities (Stewart, 2010;
p. 142; Stewart, Brown, & Langer, 2008a; p. 289). As Addison and Murshed (2005, p. 4) observed,
ethnicity ‘is often a superior basis for collective action in contemporary conflicts in poorer countries
than other social divisions’. This is particularly true where patronage relationships run largely along
ethnic lines.
There are three, broad policy approaches to reducing horizontal inequalities: (1) targeted approaches
that directly benefit the disfavoured group, such as ethnic quotas; (2) universal approaches that
indirectly benefit the disfavoured group, such as anti-discrimination laws; and (3) integrationist
approaches to break down group boundaries, such as the provision of multi-ethnic schooling
(Stewart, Brown, & Langer, 2008b, pp. 303–304).15 While targeted approaches are likely to have
greater impact, they can reinforce group identities, cause political and social tensions, and thereby
weaken social cohesion. Hence, universal approaches are often a better fit for reducing horizontal
inequalities and increasing social cohesion in post-conflict contexts (Langer, Stewart, & Venugopal,
2012; p. 25; see Easterly, Risen, & Woolcock, 2006; p. 117; see also McManus, 2017). That said, Paz
Arauco et al. (2015, p. x) contend that universal approaches are apt to be less successful in Asia and
Latin America where group exclusion and discrimination is ‘often more socially and historically
embedded’. According to them (2014, pp. ix, 21–27), a successful reduction of intersecting inequal-
ities requires an inclusive political settlement in combination with a progressive social movement.
Legal empowerment is a more universal approach to reducing horizontal inequalities (Stewart et al.,
2008b, p. 311). Indeed, Stewart lists ‘policies to help disadvantaged groups to realise their legal rights,
e.g. via legal aid’ (2010, p. 153) as examples of a universal approach. Legal empowerment can lower
social, horizontal inequality by providing an ethnic group with equal access to justice. It can lessen
economic, horizontal inequality by protecting community lands of particular ethnic groups. It can
decrease cultural horizontal inequality through recognising and enhancing a group’s customary law.
Although legal empowerment has potential to reduce horizontal inequalities, not much attention has
been paid to such inequalities.16 There are several reasons for this – most of which stem from its
conceptual schizophrenia. First, legal empowerment frequently emphasises vertical inequality – that is,
legal empowerment of the poor. Second and relatedly, it often treats the poor as a largely homogenous
group of poor individuals who are poor by reason of their exclusion from the law. Where it has
addressed intersecting inequalities, it has mainly focused on gender. Third, legal empowerment focuses
more on individual than collective rights (a problem common to both de Soto’s neo-liberalism and
Sen’s capabilities approach).17 Fourth, efforts to evaluate legal empowerment have tended to use
individuals as the unit of measure (see Gramatikov & Porter, 2010). Finally, legal empowerment often
engages with inter-personal or intra-group rather than inter-group disputes.
The ability of legal empowerment programmes to actually reduce horizontal inequalities depends of
course on both context and implementation. The context is far more ‘inauspicious’ where political,
social, economic, and cultural inequalities are mutually reinforcing; the inequalities are deeply
embedded in the political settlement, socio-economic structure, cultural norms, and plural legal
systems; and the inequalities were among the causes of conflict. Overall, horizontal inequalities
often translate into weaker drivers of, and more resistance to redistribution of income, power, and
services (cf. Kelsall et al., 2016, p. 6).
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How legal empowerment is implemented in post-conflict contexts may negatively impact on
social cohesion – and hence increase the chances of violent conflict (Langer, Stewart, Smedts, &
Demarest, 2016). Langer et al. (2016, p. 5) define social cohesion as ‘essentially a matter of how
individuals perceive others and the state’. It comprises three measurable and independent compo-
nents: inequality (both vertical and horizontal), trust (both across groups and in state institutions),
and identity (national versus group) (2016; pp. 6, 22; see Marc, Willman, Aslam, Rebosio, &
Balasuriya, 2013). Even if a legal empowerment programme reduces social or economic horizontal
inequalities, the resulting benefits to social cohesion might be more than offset by negative impacts
on political horizontal inequality, trust, and national identity. This may happen in several ways.
First, legal empowerment efforts to reduce economic and social horizontal inequalities may actually
increase political horizontal inequalities. This is because newly equalised treatment of a margin-
alised group is often perceived as unfair treatment by the formerly privileged group. Second, by
encouraging the poor to see the state as the responsible duty bearer and to challenge its failures,
legal empowerment may convert passive disinterest towards state institutions into active mistrust.
Third, and relatedly, legal empowerment may promote legal and political conflict between margin-
alised groups and the state over service delivery failures and violations of socio-economic rights.
Finally, legal empowerment’s use of customary law and informal mechanisms may increase the
lack of trust in state law and formal institutions while reinforcing a group’s identification with its
version of customary law.
3.3. Managing trade-offs
There is a risk that well-intentioned efforts to tackle horizontal inequalities may reinforce group
identities, heighten tensions, reduce social cohesion, and possibly contribute to renewed conflict.
Yet, there is also a risk that not addressing horizontal inequalities will help perpetuate them, thereby
undermining long-term prospects for an inclusive and sustainable peace. Neither option is guaranteed
to ‘do no harm’. Predicting which option will do less harm depends on various context-specific factors
as well as conflict-sensitive forecasting. In post-conflict environments, policy-makers inevitably have
to make difficult trade-offs: ‘What is best for maximizing poverty reduction and human development
may not be best for the politics of peace and recovery’ (Addison, Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazua, &
Singhal, 2015, p. 1). Indeed, it may be that expediency and peace need to take priority over equity
and needs, at least in the short to medium term (see Addison, Gisselquist, Niño-Zarazua, & Singhal,
2016; Del Castillo, 2016, p. 57).
While such trade-offs are unavoidable, there are ways to manage them and mitigate attendant
risks (Brown & Langer, 2016). First, the form of legal empowerment can be adapted to the specific
context. For example, high profile legal advocacy on horizontal inequalities (such as impact
litigation in state courts or filing a complaint to a UN or regional human rights body) is more
confrontational and threatening to powerful elites than targeting legal aid at disadvantaged ethnic
groups. Another example is that a more neo-liberal version of legal empowerment – one that
focuses on formalising individual land rights – may cause more problems where there is a history
of conflict over land. Second, legal empowerment actors can make their approaches more or less
targeted. They can adopt a universal approach to the poor that has a targeted effect if the ethnic
group is disproportionately represented among the poor. They can target their services at particular
geographic regions where more of the population comes from marginalised ethnic groups. They
can focus on less conflict-sensitive inequalities (say gender and disability) that overlap with ethnic
inequalities. They can focus on legal issues (like inheritance rights for conflict widows) that are
more prevalent among particular ethnic groups. Third, legal empowerment programming can be
sequenced. It can start with inter-personal and intra-group disputes within ethnically homogenous
communities, then later move to inter-personal and intra-group disputes within ethnically hetero-
geneous communities, and only later still move to inter-group disputes. Also, it can hold off on
addressing horizontal inequalities until after mediation mechanisms and social cohesion have been
strengthened.
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4. Legal empowerment in Liberia
Liberia was selected as an illustrative example18 for several reasons. First, it presents an opportunity to
examine how legal empowerment has been implemented in different forms in a post-conflict context.
Indeed, Liberia has become something of a lab for field experiments on legal empowerment
programmes. Second, it allows for some (albeit limited) comparison of two legal empowerment
programmes while holding the country-level contextual drivers of effectiveness constant. Third,
Liberia is an example of a pressing need to address the mutually reinforcing horizontal inequalities
that contributed to the civil war but where efforts to do so may risk worsening the situation.
4.1. Background
Liberia’s 14-year civil war devastated the infrastructure, economy, and social fabric. More than a
quarter of a million people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. The war ended with a
peace agreement in 2003. The UN deployed what was then its largest peacekeeping mission (some
15,000 troops) to assure security and stability. Elections brought President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to
power in 2006. The resulting political settlement has been fairly exclusionary – reliant on personal
rule, patrimonial networks, and corruption – but ‘relatively stable’ (Robinson & Valters, 2015;
pp. 25–26; see Menocal & Sigrist, 2011). Liberia has largely followed the liberal peace-building
model promoted by the UN (Moran, 2008; Paczynska, 2016). This has produced notable accomplish-
ments: free and fair elections, economic growth led by high levels of foreign direct investment,
strengthened state institutions, and increased security (Robinson & Valters, 2015). Civil society,
despite weak capacity and donor dependency, has become increasingly assertive in terms of policy
formulation and implementation, as well as more critical of corruption (Search for Common Ground in
Liberia, West Africa Civil Society Institute, & CIVICUS, 2014, p. 13). However, Liberia has been
much less successful in reducing the ethnic divisions and horizontal inequalities that contributed to the
civil war in the first place.19
Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) acknowledged that the war was partly
caused by high levels of horizontal inequalities between the dominant Americo-Liberians and the
native Liberians, as well as among the 16 native Liberian tribes (Republic of Liberia, 2009, p. 16). The
government has been slow to tackle these inequalities because of their political sensitivity and because
they benefit powerful elites. Although the 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) recognised
the role that horizontal inequalities played in the war, it fell ‘short of addressing HI [horizontal
inequalities] in several important ways’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2012, p. 94):
First, the document interestingly does not refer to cultural identity groups in addressing exclusion
and inequalities. The document singles out the need for special attention to children and youth,
ex-combatants, women and the ‘vulnerable’ – rather than to the historically marginalised non-
Americo-Liberians, certain ethnic groups or the rural hinterland.
Second, the operational programmes are defined in highly aggregated terms and do not target
particular beneficiary groups. For example, agricultural investments could significantly correct HI
[horizontal inequalities] if they were directed towards increasing support for small-scale farmers.
This could serve as an important starting point for building food security, reversing the neglect of
rural, African indigenous populations and stimulating pro-poor growth.
… Finally, the PRSP does not raise the issue of the distributional impact of growth by identity
group. (Fukuda-Parr, 2012, pp. 94–95)
The Agenda for Transformation (Republic of Liberia, 2012, pp. 44, 48), which followed on from the
PRSP, barely acknowledged ethnic divisions and horizontal inequalities while focusing on margin-
alised women, youth, and children.
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Economic growth has disproportionately benefited the Americo-Liberian elite, while land conces-
sions to foreign companies have reduced livelihood security for many non-Americo-Liberians in rural
areas. ‘As was the case before the war, the economic policies pursued in post-conflict Liberia have
allowed those with access to financial and political resources to marginalise and exploit those with
little access to such resources’ (Paczynska, 2016, pp. 2–3). By the end of 2012, transnational
corporations held mineral, timber, rubber, and palm oil concessions over an estimated 52 per cent of
the country (Rights and Resources Group, 2013, pp. 8–9). Some community protests against land
concessions have been met with government repression (Paczynska, 2016, p. 19). A Land Rights Act
was drafted in 2014 but was subsequently stymied in the legislature. That draft Act (2014, articles
32–51) would give communities the right to own their customary lands. In mid-2016, 18 civil society
organisations issued an open letter calling on the legislature to pass the Land Rights Act: ‘Failure to
recognise the rights of millions of Liberians to their customary lands jeopardises peace and security,
and could fuel a slide back into the conflicts that devastated our country for decades’ (Civil Society
Organizations Working Group on Land Rights in Liberia, 2016). That letter was seemingly ignored
and, as of December 2017, the Act has not been passed.
In 2013, Liberia passed the 10-year mark at which the risk of conflict-recurrence dramatically drops
off (Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2006). Still, a recent population survey gave cause for concern:
Liberians view the peace as tentative, fragile, and volatile. This assessment is not surprising,
because the fundamental problems that fuelled the violent conflict are still there – corruption in
public services, Americo-Liberian dominance over politics and the economy, marginalization of
the indigenous populations, limited economic opportunity, and restricted participation in decision
making and access to influence for the average person. (Catholic Relief Services, Justice and
Peace Commission, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Liberia, 2016, p. 3).
The same survey found the country ethnically divided, with more than 80 per cent of respondents
opposing inter-ethnic marriages within their own families (Catholic Relief Services, Justice and Peace
Commission, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Liberia 2016, p. 6). Liberia is in a period of uncertainty
with a new President (former footballer George Weah) in office20 and with the ending of the UN
Mission in Liberia (after nearly 15 years) in spring 2018.
4.2. Legal context
By the time the civil war ended, there ‘was an almost unanimous distrust of Liberia’s courts, and a
corresponding collapse in the rule of law’ (International Legal Assistance Consortium, 2003). Liberal
peacebuilding in Liberia has included standard elements of the rule of law orthodoxy: law reform,
judicial training, case management systems, and general capacity-building (Republic of Liberia, 2008,
pp. 90–92). Despite this, the Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project, 2016, p. 106) ranked Liberia
94 out of 113 countries. The formal justice sector remains weak and corrupt (US State Department,
2016, pp. 8–9). It also continues to be widely mistrusted. The Liberian TRC stated that ‘Liberians have
had little faith in judicial institutions to protect their interests or fundamental rights’ (Republic of
Liberia, 2009, p. 6). According to Afrobarometer (Logan, 2017), Liberia has the worst perceptions
ratings of any country in Africa when it comes to access to justice.
A 2010 survey found that a majority of respondents viewed the formal justice system negatively
and preferred to use customary mechanisms to resolve disputes (Vinck, Pham, & Kreutzer, 2011,
pp. 59, 65).21 Most Liberians – which is to say, most non-Americo-Liberians – use customary
justice for both strategic and normative reasons: they see it as more accessible, predictable, and
fair but also more concerned with repairing social relations (Lubkemann, Isser, & Banks, 2011,
pp. 215–217).22 Despite efforts to improve the formal justice system’s handling of gender violence
(Bacon, 2015), women victims mostly prefer the discriminatory customary justice system, partly
because the formal system can worsen their livelihood options (Divon, Sayndee, & Boas,
2016, p. 16).
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While the 2008 PRSP briefly acknowledged the role of customary justice in providing accessible
justice, it mostly highlighted violations of human rights norms. It also promised that ‘A national
framework will be developed for the exercise of informal and customary justice to ensure that it
conforms to human rights standards including gender equality, upholds the rule of law, and comple-
ments the formal justice sector’ (Republic of Liberia, 2008, p. 92). The government has since
regulated the customary justice system, limiting its jurisdiction and its use of trial by ordeal
(Lubkemann et al., 2011, pp. 220–226). The government’s larger goal is to move away from
Liberia’s historic dualism, which reinforced divisions between the capital and the hinterland, and
between Americo-Liberians and native Liberians (see Republic of Liberia, 2009). While mostly well-
intentioned, ‘this “progressive” approach is seen by many rural [native] Liberians as yet another in a
long historical line of undesired impositions by a Monrovian elite (and its international backers) on the
rest of the country’ (Lubkemann et al., 2011, p. 203). The government’s reforms to customary justice
also threaten to weaken one of the few effective conflict resolution mechanisms in the country
(Lubkemann et al., 2011, p. 221).
There has been considerable advocacy for improving access to justice. International Crisis Group
(2006, pp. 11–13) issued an influential report in 2006 that called on donors, government, and civil
society to create a community-based paralegal programme modelled on Timap in Sierra Leone.23 The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended increased access to justice (Republic of Liberia,
2009, p. 389). The 2008 PRSP linked access to justice and horizontal inequalities: ‘providing more
equal access to justice will contribute to eliminating the marginalization of some groups, which helped
fuel the conflict’ (Republic of Liberia, 2008, p. 84). The 2012 Agenda for Transformation (Republic of
Liberia, 2012, pp. 39, 51) promised to expand access to justice but made no mention of paralegals. A
2013 conference co-hosted by the government resolved to look into formalising paralegal services
(Dereymaeker, 2016, p. 15). The UN Peacebuilding Fund (2016, p. 11) helped fund a community
paralegal programme. Despite such support, Liberia did not issue a National Legal Aid Policy until
2016 (see Gertler, 2014, pp. 968–972) and legal aid still faces considerable opposition from legal and
political elites (see Chapman & Payne, 2018, pp. 224–225). For example, the judge who chaired
Liberia’s Independent National Human Rights Commission expressed concerns about using paralegals
to provide legal aid to the poor (Barpeen, 2016). Liberia contrasts unfavourably with Sierra Leone,
which passed a ‘model’ legal aid law in 2012 (Dereymaeker, 2016, pp. 19–22).24 This difference may
be partly explained by the fact that Liberia’s political settlement is less inclusive and policy-making
less consultative than in Sierra Leone (Onoma, 2014).
One of the main legal issues that ordinary Liberians face is land disputes. A population survey
found land to be the most common category of disputes, with approximately 16 per cent of
respondents having experienced such disputes since the end of the war (Vinck et al., 2011, p. 47).
These disputes (most of which involve land-grabbing of house plots) were less likely to be resolved
(Vinck et al., 2011, p. 61). Another study found that ‘Disputes about land were identified by the
population as the most prevalent, countrywide source of tension’ (as cited in Knight, Slakor, & Kaba,
2013, p. 37). In a recent population survey, many respondents identified land disputes as a main
conflict trigger (Catholic Relief Services, 2016, p. 3)
Overall, the contextual drivers for effective legal empowerment are mixed. Relatively successful
security sector reform and UN peacekeeping have assured security. The political settlement is fairly
exclusive but stable. State capacity has been strengthened. There have been improvements to the rule
of law and human rights, including a right to information law. Civil society organisations are more
assertive. There is ongoing international support from the international community. There are also
some negative factors: a weak social contract, deeply entrenched horizontal inequalities, weak social
cohesion, and high youth unemployment (Catholic Relief Services, Justice and Peace Commission,
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Liberia, 2016; Menocal & Sigrist, 2011; pp. 14–16). Perhaps most
importantly, many Liberian elites have little interest in programmes, like legal empowerment, that
might challenge their corrupt, patronage networks.
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4.3. Legal empowerment and horizontal inequalities in Liberia: two community paralegal
programmes
Kelsall, Hart and Laws’ work (2016) suggests that progress in legal empowerment provision in this
political economy context will be best advanced when external stakeholders play a government-
substituting role. Indeed, that is what they have done, with donors, international NGOs, and domestic
civil society organisations running or funding various community paralegal and mediation
programmes.25
The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission has been running a mobile paralegal service,
Community Justice Advisors (CJA), for ‘historically marginalised’ communities in seven, mostly
rural counties since 2007. CJAwas an outgrowth of earlier civic education programmes that had led to
increasing requests for legal advice (Carter, 2008, p. 17). CJA has received support from both the
Carter Center and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (Chapman & Payne, 2018, pp. 215, 223 and n. 43).26
Former President Jimmy Carter (2008, pp. 14–15) described the motivation for his Center’s support to
community paralegals:
While the health establishment trusts trained local citizens to administer basic health care and
preventive education within their communities, legal establishments have been much slower to
explore ways that problem solving can be devolved to ordinary citizens. One important cause of
civil war is when poor or marginalised groups believe they have no legal recourse through which
to protect their rights from more powerful elites. In countries recovering from war, this core
problem will remain if reform of the legal system does not also include active ways to connect to
the citizens’ immediate needs, including regaining their trust.
While CJAwas modelled on Timap in Sierra Leone (Carter, 2008, p. 17), it differs in three ways. CJA
paralegals are mobile, with each working across 10 communities. CJA has taken a softer approach to
legal empowerment, focusing more on awareness-raising and generally avoiding litigation (and threats
of litigation) (Graef, 2015, pp. 108, 158). Finally, ‘CJAs were prohibited from proactively soliciting
cases in order to maintain good relations in their communities’ (Graef, 2015, p. 160).
Most of the cases handled by CJA paralegals are land/property and family disputes with only
11 per cent involving government abuse and corruption and 4 per cent involving social infrastructure
(Chapman & Payne, 2013, p. 19).27 More than 40 per cent of all cases were resolved through
facilitated negotiation by paralegals (Chapman & Payne, 2018, p. 217). In a field experiment,
Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013, p. 33) found that paralegal clients rated case outcomes as fairer and
relations with opposing parties as better than the control group.28 They also found greater food
security though not ‘any impacts on behavior related to actions taken to protect property rights
(land titling and demarcation) or engage in credit market activity (lending and borrowing)’
(Sandefur & Siddiqi, 2013). That finding suggests the programme is not empowering clients beyond
their specific, individual cases.
In contrast to CJA’s generalist paralegals, the Sustainable Development Institute (SDI), a Liberian
NGO, helped train a more specialised group of community paralegals to document community land
within their home communities.29 The paralegals were just one strand in a larger strategy to protect
community lands in the face of ongoing land concessions (Maru & Yiah, 2013, pp. 10–11). SDI also
advocated for a land policy permitting formalisation of customary rights (Maru, 2014; p. 206; SDI,
2015). It signed the unsuccessful open letter urging the legislature to pass the draft Land Rights Act in
2016. For the paralegal project, SDI selected five communities in Rivercess County for paralegal
support. Community land documentation processes,
which document the perimeter of the community according to customary boundaries, are a low-cost,
efficient, and equitable way of protecting communities’ customary land claims. Such efforts protect
large numbers of families’ lands at once, as well as the common lands and forests that are often the
first to be allocated to investors, claimed by elites, and appropriated for state development projects.
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Importantly, formal recognition of their customary land claims gives communities critical leverage in
negotiations with potential investors. (Knight et al., 2013, pp. 12–13)
Given the unsettled state of land law and the President’s moratorium on land sales, SDI performed a
‘skeletal documentation process’ pursuant to a memorandum of understanding that it negotiated with
the Land Commission (Knight et al., 2013, p. 14).
Land documentation inevitably resurrected old disputes and created new ones. As a result, the
paralegals combined legal education and assistance with ‘the peace-building work of land conflict
resolution’ (Knight et al., 2013, p. 15). In some communities, the threat of outside investors created a
strong enough incentive to resolve disputes, both within the community and with neighbouring
communities (Knight et al., 2013, pp. 17, 64). The land documentation process, which created new
participatory forms of community governance, sometimes empowered community members vis-à-vis
their traditional leaders (Kaba & Keyser, 2015).
There is very little public information about how these two paralegal programmes addressed horizontal
inequalities. This is not surprising given the lack of attention that legal empowerment scholars, policy-
makers, and practitioners have paid to the issue. However, the lack of data about the ethnicity of paralegals,
clients, and communities makes it very hard to evaluate how the programmes impacted horizontal inequal-
ities, if at all. Nonetheless, a few, tentative observations can be made. Given the pattern of horizontal
inequalities in Liberia, a universal legal empowerment programme for the poor is in effect targeted at the non-
Americo-Liberian majority. The CJA community paralegal programme was further targeted at ‘historically
marginalised’ communities so it will have benefited specific ethnic groups in those communities. However,
CJA is unlikely to have made much difference to social horizontal inequalities given its generalist caseload,
case-by-case approach, resolutely demand-side focus, and emphasis on rights awareness and mediation.
Overall, CJA points to the innate limitations of a tactical approach to legal empowerment when it comes to
horizontal inequalities.
By contrast, SDI’s community land documentation programme had more potential for reducing both
social and economic horizontal inequalities. For one thing, it emphasised collective action and community
empowerment. For another, it adopted a more strategic approach to legal empowerment. Most importantly,
it protected communities of small-scale farmers from dispossession and put them in a better position to
negotiate more favourable land agreements – something that can begin to reduce economic horizontal
inequalities between native Liberians and the Americo-Liberian elite (see Fukuda-Parr, 2012, p. 94).
However, SDI deliberately limited the potential impact of the programme on horizontal inequality by
choosing a more ethnically homogenous county and deliberately selecting more cohesive communities:
Given Liberia’s post-conflict situation and the potential for land documentation work to incite
confrontation, SDI determined that it was best to conduct the investigation in a county with a
relatively homogenous population and a low-density residential pattern. For these reasons, SDI
selected Rivercess County as the study region, as 97 per cent of residents are Bassa, and the
county has a population density of 33 people per square mile. SDI hypothesised that these
characteristics would assure a fairly unified local population and reduce the potential for identity-
based conflict during the community land documentation process, as might occur in more diverse
counties. (Knight et al., 2013; p. 50; see Kaba, 2015, p. 9)
SDI recognised that this may mean that their findings will not apply to more ethnically diverse
counties with higher population densities ‘but deemed it necessary to begin the work in a context less
prone to arousing suspicion, fear, and violent conflict’ (Knight et al., 2013, p. 50 n. 70).30
5. Conclusion
This article posed the question of whether legal empowerment can address horizontal inequalities in
post-conflict settings, and, if so, how. The paucity of evidence from legal empowerment programmes
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in Liberia and elsewhere makes it very difficult to reach any but the most tentative conclusions.
However, this highlights the need for legal empowerment scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners to
pay greater attention to horizontal inequalities – how they impact and are impacted by legal empow-
erment programmes – when designing, implementing, and evaluating such programmes. Hence, the
Liberia programmes presented here can be considered ‘less of a review of the evidence than … a
review of the need for more evidence’ (Fox, 2016, p. 7).
Legal empowerment may have some modest potential to reduce horizontal inequalities, especially
social ones, although there is not yet sufficient evidence to be confident of this and effects are likely
to vary by context and by specific programming. This potential is likely to be greater where the
political settlement is more inclusive and institutions less personalistic. It is also greater where
programmes, including community paralegals, adopt a twin-track approach and mobilise collective
action around a threatened collective good (for example, customary community land). Post-conflict
environments are particularly ‘inauspicious’ environments for legal empowerment and even more so
where horizontal inequalities contributed to conflict in the first place. There, efforts to reduce
horizontal inequalities could wind up reinforcing group identities, reducing social cohesion, and,
in the worst case, triggering conflict. Hence, in these contexts, legal empowerment practitioners may
need to privilege expediency (peace) over need (equity) at least in the short-term – as SDI did in
Liberia when it targeted its programme at communities that were more (ethnically) cohesive rather
than more needy. As the authors of the SDI study concluded: ‘Should a dysfunctional community
initiate land documentation efforts and not be able to complete them, the process may invigorate
tensions and create or exacerbate conflict, leaving the community in a worse situation than before
the intervention began’ (Knight et al., 2013, p. 22).
Legal empowerment for community land titling offers more potential to positively reduce
horizontal inequalities than other legal empowerment initiatives. In post-conflict contexts, how-
ever, it may well create intra- and inter-community disputes that deepen horizontal inequalities and
cause inter-group disputes. De Simone (2015, p. 60) found that, in South Sudan, ‘tenure reform
ultimately seems to strengthen a local definition of citizenship understood in ethnic terms and to
deepen horizontal inequalities, fostering potential violent competition over communal rights to
resources.’ What is needed is more comparative analysis of legal empowerment initiatives on
community land titling within different regions of a post-conflict state (Liberia as the SDI
programmes expands beyond Rivercess County) as well as across post-conflict states where
horizontal inequalities played a role in the conflict (Liberia and Uganda) and where they did
not (Mozambique).31
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Notes
1. This article uses the term post-conflict as crude shorthand for attempted transitions away from conflict that are marked by
peace agreements or military victories.
2. While the term ‘horizontal inequality’ is somewhat opaque, it is used here because it has been adopted by several, influential
development actors (including DFID and the World Bank).
3. A political settlement is generally seen as the elite bargaining process (or meta-rules) for distributing power and rents
without resort to violent conflict (see, for example Kelsall et al., 2016).
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4. Domingo and O’Neil list six different definitions of legal empowerment that post-date the Commission’s report (Domingo &
O’Neil, 2014, Annex 1).
5. For critiques of the Commission’s neo-liberalism, see for example Otto (2009).
6. This is what Gramatikov and Porter (2010) term ‘subjective legal empowerment’.
7. For applications of these power categories to legal empowerment programmes, see for example Feruglio (2017) and
Lombardini & Vigneri (2015).
8. The UN Development Programme [UNDP] (2009, p. 9, n.3), which hosted the Commission, subsequently criticised it for
focusing on specific livelihood rights at the expense of a broader, rights-based approach.
9. Joshi and Houtzager (2012) have critiqued the shift in social accountability practice to more apolitical, technocratic
‘widgets’ such as community scorecards.
10. The Commission (2008, p. 302) adopted its typology of political systems from Grindle (2007).
11. There is increasing recognition among development scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners that programmes need to
empower not just the poor but also the frontline state officials who lack knowledge, skills, and resources (Cima, 2013; p. 27;
see McGee & Gaventa, 2011; pp. 23–24).
12. There is a more developed evidence base for social accountability programmes, though that is still ‘thin’when it comes to impact on
state-society and intra-society relations (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015, pp. 197, 220), particularly in post-conflict contexts.
13. Similarly, UNDP (2014) acknowledged that some of the programmes it assessed were not ‘initially structured through the
explicit lens of legal empowerment’.
14. See for example the special issue on ‘Legal Empowerment in Transition’ in The International Journal of Human Rights 19:3 (2015).
15. These approaches can be combined in practice: for example, an anti-discrimination law (a universal approach) can be
selectively enforced (a targeted approach).
16. One notable exception is in relation to indigenous peoples, particularly around land tenure systems and intellectual property
(Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, 2008, pp. 78–79, 90–91, 145–146, 216–217).
17. Stewart (2005) has critiqued human development thinking for largely overlooking group capabilities.
18. In a recent review article, Fox (2016, p. 7) writes that ‘Because of the limited research base, the cases presented here are
illustrations of “proof of concept” rather than definitive evidence.’ Here, there is not even sufficient evidence for the two
Liberia programmes to illustrate ‘proof of concept’.
19. A longitudinal study of nearly 250 communities found that ‘inter-tribal biases are pervasive, that ethnic minorities are often
excluded from communal life, and that a vast majority of rural Liberians believe that “some people in the country act like
citizens when they are not”’ (Blair, Blattman, & Hartmann, 2011, p. 31). The study also found that ethnic heterogeneity,
rather than other social cleavages, played a role in most crime and violence (p. 28).
20. Like President Sirleaf, Weah is a native Liberian.
21. In a different survey, approximately 40 per cent of respondents stated that both police and courts were corrupt (Blair et al.,
2011, pp. 12–13).
22. Sandefur and Siddiqi (2013, p. 23) presented a more rational choice explanation: ‘plaintiffs trade off the rights afforded them
in the formal system in favor of the more efficient legal remedies delivered by customary courts.’
23. For a discussion of that report’s influence, see Graef (2015, pp. 87, 102–103).
24. As of late 2016, however, Sierra Leone’s legal aid board had not recognised, let alone funded, community paralegals (Maru
& Gauri, 2018, p. 18).
25. The Norwegian Refugee Council ran a mediation programme (Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance) for land
disputes in five counties from 2006 to 2015 (Chapman & Payne, 2018; pp. 213–214; Norton, 2011). The majority of those
disputes were intra-tribal (Norton, 2011, p. 14). Prison Fellowship Liberia partnered with the East-West Management
Institute (n.d.) to run a USAID-funded mediation project in four counties aimed at reducing lengthy pre-trial detention
(Chapman & Payne, 2018, p. 212). The Foundation for International Dignity, a Liberian NGO, has conducted several
mediation and access to justice projects with the support of international donors (see http://findliberia.org/node/51).
26. The Carter Center (2017) takes a holistic approach to justice in Liberia. Besides CJA, it also supports capacity building for
the formal justice sector, strengthening traditional dispute resolution, and radio programming on legal awareness.
27. These statistics suggest that CJA paralegals and clients do not generally view the state as the accountable duty-bearer.
28. Graef (2015, pp. 119–149) describes how that field experiment actively reshaped the CJA’s legal empowerment programme
in an effort to generate meaningful data. He concludes that ‘the legal empowerment project was appropriated by the impact
evaluation’ (Graef, 2015, p. 148). Whether that appropriation helped CJA’s clients is unclear.
29. SDI has been supported in these efforts by the International Development Law Organization and Namati.
30. SDI has expanded its paralegal programme to other communities in Liberia but there is no detailed information about this on
the SDI website.
31. IDLO and Namati have worked on community land documentation in Liberia, Mozambique, and Uganda.
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